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The views expressed in Policy Warning Reports belong to the authors 
only and do not engage in any form the members or sponsors of the 
Romanian Academic Society. 
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ho  won and who lost the June local 
elections? What do the results tell us about 
the national elections to be held in 
November this year? What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of the ruling party and the 
opposition alliance? How should the local governments be 
reformed in order to function well, irrespective of who wins 
elections? All these, and more, in this issue of PWR. The final 
sections analyzes the Romanian telecom market from the 
perspective of EU accession.  
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TREND 
 
 
 
 
SAR was proved right 
 
 
 
LOCAL ELECTIONS SHOWED THAT 
ROMANIANS WANT A MAJOR 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN 2004  
However, the PSD has distorted and will further distort 
the will of the electorate by abusing its power 
Local elections in Romania have always created confusion. This  allowed 
the PSD to claim victory in every election held after 1989 (even when it 
was still called PDSR, FSN, etc). However, these victories were always 
controversial because PSD never managed to win the most important 
cities and county councils. Real politics typically began only after 
elections, when Mr. Cozmâncă (former Minister of Administration,  current 
deputy president of PSD) would have his prefects dismiss elected mayors, 
a practice abandoned just under heavy pressure from the Council of 
Europe, or recruit mayors through bribe and blackmail (such methods are 
still largely used; see the biographies of candidates in The Voter’s Guide 
issued by the Coalition for a Clean Parliament). There are thus two main 
issues when we talk about local elections in Romania. One is the ballot 
itself, i.e. the functioning of elections, the quality of electoral campaigns, 
the dynamics of the electoral process and the analysis of outcomes. The 
second topic is, however, at least as important. It concerns democracy 
and democratic mechanisms. Elections are held so that we can 
democratically control local government. But can Romanians actually do 
that?  We cast a vote on Sunday, the 6th of June. Was that of any 
importance? Or is real politics actually pursued through mechanisms other 
than elections? What can we do to make it worth voting in the next local 
elections? What can we do in order to convince more than half of the 
electorate that such elections do make sense, and that those elected are 
really in power? 
The political section of this SAR report is therefore divided into two parts. In 
the first part we are going to analyze the outcome of elections and 
discuss the degree to which we can consider these elections democratic. 
In the second part we will have a look at the real mechanisms of local 
power, and the way these mechanisms are distorted by the government 
through bad practices against a background of unfinished institutional 
reforms. Both parts formulate recommendations aimed at improving 
accountability and administrative performance, objectives repeatedly 
stressed in the Annual Country Reports of the EU Commission.   
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Who are the actual winners and losers of 2004 local 
elections ? 
Outcomes are split. However, results for county and local councils clearly 
show that the PSD did not win the elections. Anyway, not in those counties 
where it openly ran as a party, and not under the umbrella of some newly 
recruited local oligarch (the case of Mazăre, the mayor of Constanţa, 
recruited last year). PSD rather has lost than won. Of course, their position 
is not that bad when we compare these outcomes with those of the 2000 
elections or even of earlier elections. PSD has kept its strongholds in the 
poor rural regions, where control over resources means control over all the 
important local players, and thus control over politics. However, defending 
its old positions was not enough anymore, as the opposition Alliance 
witnessed a spectacular growth. Let us have a look at the evolution of 
each party compared to prior elections. 
1. PSD stagnated compared to the 2000 local elections, but lost 
compared to the Alliance, as well as compared to its own targets. The 
PSD finds itself far lower than the 50% it had been scoring in house 
surveys, and lower than the 40% score in independent polls. At the end 
of the first round of elections, the PSD was not able to defend its 70% 
recruited mayors and went back to the 2000 situation of 36% of the 
mayors. They will most probably still win back some of them in the 
second round, but it is clear that they will not be able to win in 
elections what they had managed to conquer through recruitment 
and political migration in the last years. The PSD had, however, a good 
performance in terms of local councilors.  
2. The Alliance D.A. was the main winner of the elections, managing to 
maximize its performance both compared to the individual 
performance of the two parties in the 2000 elections and as an 
alliance of the Opposition. PD has grown from 10% to more than 15%. 
PNL went from 7% up to 18% (if we split the votes of the Alliance 
equally and round them down). When we add this to their crushing 
victory in Bucharest and to the good position of the PD for the second 
round in certain towns, we may say that the Alliance had a great 
performance, also managing to overtake the PRM in every aspect. 
The success they had with joint lists in Bucharest,  where they won 
much more votes than if they had run separately, shows that the best 
electoral publicity of the Alliance is its unity – an idea already stressed 
by SAR prior to elections. PNL has managed to win back most of the 
PNTcd’s (Christian Democrats) disappointed electorate. PD 
succeeded in taking away votes from the PRM, the extreme right. The 
Alliance won back the urban areas by taking away votes both from 
the PSD and the PRM.  
3. PRM stagnated, as there was no significant gain compared to 2000 for 
the ultranationalists. The votes in urban areas went to the Alliance, 
which was seen as an alternative that stood greater chances of 
winning elections. The main campaigner of the party, Vadim Tudor, 
was rather discreet, as he focused on changing his image into a more 
respectable, mainstream politician, which sent an unclear message to 
his public. The PRM lost in terms of mayors, as Gh. Funar was defeated 
in Cluj. Our previous reports had already launched this hypothesis that 
the constituency of PRM was much more radical than the party itself.  
4. The newly appeared PUR (“Humanistic party”, centrist formation set up 
by a media mogul) is now on its own feet, thanks to their success in 
Bacău.  
The PSD did not lose 
in absolute terms, 
but it lost compared 
to its own 
expectations, its 
competitors and, 
first of all, 
compared to its 
situation at the 
beginning of 2004 
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Conclusion: The 5% electoral threshold introduced in 2000 generated a 
coagulation of the electorate around four main political parties. This 
explains the growth of these parties compared to 1996, when a lot of 
votes were wasted on small actors. The raising of the threshold brought 
along the stabilization of the party system and led to an increased 
concentration of votes in 2004 compared to 2000. Therefore, the main 
losers of these elections were small parties, which do not stand any 
chance in the November ballot.  
Fig. 1. The growth of major political parties compared to previous elections 
 
All figures higher than 0.5 were rounded up. In the previous report we rounded them 
down, which has generated endless discussions and  protests from the PSD. We 
therefore warn that the total may now be higher than 100%, as then it was lower than 
100%.  
 
Why did these results come as a surprise? 
Such outcomes may seem surprising, but they should not be. In the special 
issue of PWR published in March, SAR’s forecast was that the PSD was 
going to lose around a quarter of its constituency of 40% predicted by the 
SAR-CURS poll conducted in March. At the same time, one of our 
questions in the survey showed that 42% of the Romanians believed a 
political alternative to the PSD already existed, compared to 39% of them, 
who did not. In other words, there were clear – although indirect – signs 
that we were heading towards parity between the PSD and the Alliance, 
with a slight advantage for the latter. 
The surprise, if there was any, was a generated by surveys only, especially 
by those contracted by PSD with IMAS, Minister Teodorescu’s company. 
The difference between Mircea Geoană and Traian Băsescu had been 
forecasted by this institute as zero (impartial!), while CSOP and CURS had 
predicted higher margins. The closest survey to elections in terms of timing, 
the one conducted by Metromedia, which was not made public, gave 
the best predictions. 
CURS and IMAS were the only two institutes, which have constantly 
surveyed the political preferences of voters at national level. Their 
predictions differed constantly and significantly with regard to the 
forecasted performance of the PSD. IMAS (opinion poll ordered by the 
PSD) granted the PSD around 50% of the votes, while CURS (omnibus 
political survey co-financed by SAR and a liberal association) was 
Local elections for County Councils 
% of votes 
Political Parties 
1996 2000 2004 Growth 
PSD (PDSR) 16 27 33 + 6 
PD (within USD) 11 10 13+5/2 + 6 
PNL  7 16+5/2 + 11 
Alliance of the 
Opposition  
20 (CDR) 7 (CDR) 34 (DA)  
PRM 4 7 8 +1 
PUR  2 6 + 4 
UDMR 7 6 6 --- 
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predicting a 40% figure. IMAS’ director, Mircea Kivu, has even organized a 
workshop of a professional association with a  pompous name – The 
Romanian Society for Marketing and Public Opinion (SORMA) – in order to 
explain us that both results were equally scientific and blamed the 
methodology for the inconsistency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. How close were polls on mayoral elections in Bucharest to the final 
result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The directors of IMAS and CURS say that Romanians can further trust pre-
electoral surveys, even if the results presented by these institutes indicate 
significantly different percentages for the government party. They denied the 
allegation that such differences were caused by their party ‘affiliation’ and argued 
that the real cause for this was the fact that each institute has its own methods of 
measuring public opinion.”  
Cotidianul newspaper, quoting the press conference of Mr Mircea Chivu, IMAS, 
and Sebastian Lazaroiu, CURS, held in April 2004. 
http://www.cotidianul.ro/anterioare/2004/politica/pol1218apr.htm 
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SAR’s Forecast, March 2004 
“45% of those declaring they would vote for the PSD today would also like to see a 
change at the 2004 elections, and a quarter of the PSD constituency believes 
there is a viable political alternative to the government party. The votes of this 
electorate will probably go to other parties during the electoral campaign – either 
towards the Alliance, or towards the PRM. A change is desired especially in cities 
with more than 200,000 people, in which the electorate would vote for the Alliance 
PNL-PD.” 
Policy Warning Report No. 6/2004, Romanian Academic Society, March 2004 
 
 Yes (%) No (%) 
Is there a political alternative capable of governing the 
country 
42 39 
Romania needs a change at the 2004 elections 72 19 
SAR-CURS Survey, March 2004 
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Fig. 3.  The difference between reality and the predictions made by IMAS 
and CURS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is actually no difference in methodology, which can explain this 
situation, as both percentages were calculated on the basis of those 
expressing an option – as was the case for the outcomes of elections for 
County Council. Moreover, the PSD percentage was growing according 
to IMAS, while the same percent was decreasing according to CURS. The 
same happened with predicting the outcome for the Alliance: IMAS 
forecasted a decreasing trend, and CURS an increasing trend. As a whole, 
CURS was much closer to predicting the outcome, and was wrong only 
with regard to the ratio between democrats and liberals. CURS has 
constantly presented the liberals as being twice as strong as the 
democrats. In general, democrats have been disadvantaged by all 
opinion polls, and especially by the mega survey conducted by CURS in 
December, which played an essential role in the process of distributing 
seats on the common lists of the Alliance.  
It is also true that voters have overstated in polls their voting intention for 
the PSD. Presenting the PSD at 50% within surveys did not succeed in 
convincing the electorate, but managed to create an environment in 
which recruiting elites became much easier and in which ordinary people 
were more cautious when answering survey questions. 
What were the strengths of PSD? 
The gains of the PSD in these elections have three major sources: 
1. Their control over local and regional elites, especially in the least 
developed regions. This allowed for the manipulation of local 
resources, especially within rural areas (see the case-study below).  The 
reason for which local elites support the PSD is their previous 
experience, which says that PSD policies would further allow them to 
control local resources. Government policies regarding landed 
The lead of PSD ahead of the Alliance D.A. at national level, 
as predicted by each institute; and the real difference of the 
votes for County Councils, June 2004. 
-1%
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The electoral results 
are surprising only 
for those who 
trusted the surveys 
ordered by the 
parties themselves 
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property, forests’ restitution and the form and bureaucracy of 
agriculture subsidies do nothing but foster the peasants’ lack of 
autonomy within poor regions and the empowerment of those in 
control of local resources. This is a typical Third World pattern, which 
functions successfully in more than one third of Romania today, where 
the PSD leads by large in mayoral elections after the first round.  
2. Their control over electronic media, through agenda-setting and 
through manipulation of independent opinion leaders. Analysts invited 
to different shows were either inhibited most of the time, because they 
were afraid of not being invited again, or showed a general kindness 
towards people in power. For instance, corruption was only discussed 
in general terms, while no clear corruption case of a candidate was 
brought up, although there were enough examples. The electoral 
show on TVR2, in which candidates from a certain city were invited 
together, but talked separately, instead of talking to each other, is a 
good example of a visible effort of preventing any consistent 
campaign. Moreover, the party-in-government was clearly favored 
through priming. The peak of this manipulation was reached on the 
8th of June, when several TV channels, including the public one, have 
announced the cancellation of elections in Costineşti, insinuating that 
the  Opposition, i.e. the one initially afraid of electoral fraud, had been 
the actual fraudster. In reality, the Opposition was actually the one 
most affected by this cancellation, as it had won that constituency. 
However, the news supported the idea that it was not the 
government, but the Opposition, that was the fraudster in elections. 
3. Their control over authorities responsible for regulating elections. Both 
the CAN (National Council for Audiovisual) and the BEC (Central 
Electoral Office) favored the PSD. The CNA made absurd interventions 
trying to limit general image losses of the PSD. Besides stupidly limiting 
the length of TV spots, they interfered in matters related to the 
contents of ads, which is a completely undemocratic procedure and 
has no precedent within consolidated democracies. Their interference 
affected the Opposition mostly. Such examples are hilarious, like, for 
instance, an ordinary TV clip of the PUR, which was banned by the 
CNA according to art. 60(4) and art. 64.c of the 67/2004 Act, i.e. 
because the clip did not prove “possible allegations with penal or 
moral incidence with regard to another candidate”. How did the clip 
sound like? 
“December 1989 
Romanians risked their lives in the name of democracy 
Can we actually talk about democracy in Romania today? 
What kind of democracy do we have since corrupted politicians, 
Paper billionaires and local lords humiliate us? 
Since our children have to wait for hours in front of the doctor’s office 
And our parents survive on miserable pensions? 
Since authorities fail as they did with the Mihailesti tragedy! 
PUR fights for democracy! 
Don’t waste your vote on those 
Who have disappointed you for the last 14 years! 
Vote for PUR!   PUR ad banned by CNA 
 
There was no reason for the CNA to ban such an ad. This is a clear case of 
censorship. The same happened with the Central Electoral Office (BEC). It 
rejected all the complaints filed by the Opposition, so that the PSD 
withdraws its own complaints. It first forbade the press to publish electoral 
The PSD control 
over the public 
discourse has 
influenced local 
elites rather than 
voters; in villages 
power is exerted 
through traditional, 
pre-modern 
methods 
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opinions one day before elections, and then canceled the directive. In 
general, communication with the media was very poor. 
Fig. 4. Compared outcomes for mayoral elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mayoral elections 
% of mandates 
Political 
Parties 
1996 2000 2003, % of the 
mandates in-
between elections 
2004 first round (% 
of assigned 
mandates) 
2004 first round 
 (% of total number 
of mandates, 2727) 
PSD 32 36 65 70 29 
PD  16 16 10 6 2 
PNL  9 7 8 3 
CDR 12 5 2 -- -- 
PRM 2 2 1 0.47 0.22 
UDMR 5 5 5 12 5 
 
Case Study 
HOW DO PEOPLE VOTE IN RURAL ROMANIA 
The Third World begins 15 km away from Universitatii Square 
 
The same as in the entire country, local elections were held in District No.17, Cornetu village, 
Ilfov county, on Sunday, the 6th of June. The same as in many other villages and towns, the 
favorite candidate was the current PSD mayor. The same as in the entire country, the three 
election offices opened at 7.00 a.m., after the urns, booths and stamps had been checked. 
However, we fear to qualify what followed since in Cornetu as a typical situation for elections 
in rural Romania. Although we have enough reasons to do that. 
The village Cornetu has around 3000 voters on its permanent lists. Turnout was already high 
early in the morning. People were waiting in lines in front of two of the three voting offices: 
elder people and Rroma. The latter came in large groups, led by a sort of ”bulibasa” assistant 
(their actual “bulibasa”/leader is now the one from the Bragadiru village, as the one from 
Cornetu is in jail), who was ‘monitoring’ elections from 7 o’clock in the morning until late at 
night.  
Although most of the Rroma declared themselves illiterate, some had driving licenses or were 
able to sign their names just fine on the lists. According to Act No.67/2004, voters have the 
right to ask for a guide to enter with them in the voting booth, provided they have a well-
grounded reason for that. In most of these cases, the guide was either the Mayor in-office, or 
a councilor. They would even offer themselves as guides when they were not asked for help 
directly. Their help came nevertheless more as a second control, because people had already 
been given certain ‘incentives’ right before elections. The mayor had obtained the 
authorization to connect the village to the regional network of gas pipes almost two years ago, 
but opened the pipes only a few weeks prior to elections. Moreover, a large number of the 
villagers had received their social aids only one week before elections, although the payment 
of these aids was due three months earlier. Voting was also allowed with expired identity 
cards, based on the confirmation of the police chief that the respective person really was who 
he pretended to be.   
In two out of three voting offices, the mayor and the other candidates actively participated in 
counting the votes. As soon as the mayor’s victory became certain (four times more votes 
than his closest challenger), he came out at the balcony and greeted the crowds gathered in 
front of the city hall (which was used as voting office),  and then allowed people to come into 
the building in order to celebrate his victory. People were singing, cheering and insulting other 
candidates on the corridors of the City hall, while elections officers were still counting votes.  
R O M A N I A N  A C A D E M I C  S O C I E T Y  ( S A R )  
 12 
Strengths and weaknesses of the opposition 
The Alliance pursued a good strategy in Bucharest, as it promoted the 
idea of a team, which had a tremendous success. On the other hand, it 
lost in those places, in which it did not use the same strategy. In Iasi, for 
instance, it lost to the PSD the majority predicted by the CURS mega 
survey, because of its division and its confusing message. It was a mistake 
not to sign electoral alliances for a single candidate both in Iasi and in 
Timisoara.  Such alliances would have maximized their gains in terms of the 
number of mandates won. They will do this for the second round of 
elections for sure, but it will already be too late, as the majorities within the 
councils cannot be changed anymore. As a general rule, the Alliance 
benefited from an anti-PSD trend among the electorate. This was the 
actual engine behind its major victories, rather than its own strategy. 
Voters went for a change, and in places where they did not trust the 
Alliance (as in the case of Bacau, where the candidates of the Alliance 
had an ‘impressive’ record of corruption) they voted for any other 
alternative, such as PUR , PNTcd and so on. 
What will happen in the general elections? 
As the experience of former mandates show, the existent political 
framework in Romania would only allow it to be governed by a coalition. 
A legislative alliance with the PRM is hard to imagine. However, a party, 
which gains around 42-43% of the votes, plus some extra votes from 
redistribution, could have the majority in Parliament with an ally such as 
the UDMR or PUR. The Alliance stands the chance of getting this percent in 
general elections instead of the PSD, provided they pursue their Bucharest 
strategy in the whole country. SAR has previously argued that Traian 
Basescu would have made a stronger candidate in presidential elections. 
Traian Basescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor have the highest potential for 
an electoral campaign. However, the final competition will take place 
between Stolojan and Nastase, partly because of the same questionable 
surveys. The competition seems nevertheless balanced, and the 
impossible looks suddenly possible: the PSD might loose both its positions, 
once the D.A. Alliance becomes a clear, credible alternative. The UDMR is 
a certain ally in any of the two possible outcomes. PUR needs to defend 
the position they gained on Sunday in legislative elections, so that they 
would be able to play the arbiter in this game. The PNL and the PD have a 
clear protocol, which entails enough details and allows them not to waste 
time anymore with what has been their major problem – balancing their 
respective influence within the Alliance. Nevertheless, they have little time 
to build a force capable of convincing Romanian voters, as well as the 
skeptics of the international community that they are a serious alternative, 
which is able to further successfully our European integration process. 
Was the turnout low? 
Turnout was low, but not lower than in 2000. The degree of mobilization 
among the electorate was higher. The real question is, again, why the 
surveys’ predictions regarding participation where so far from reality. And, 
most of all, what should we do in order to better predict the turnout in the 
elections next fall. SAR’s suggestion is to use an indirect question as a 
predictor for this. In 2004 the voter’s level of competence (subjective 
competence) can be a good such measure. Voters who have declared 
themselves unaware of either political platforms or candidates did not go 
to vote.  
The best assest of 
the Alliance is its 
unity, not their own 
local barons who 
compete against 
those of the PSD; 
the party 
“strategists” who 
recommended 
separate lists should 
admit their error 
and step down 
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Fig. 5. Turnout in local elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Romania needs the permanent electoral body that the civil society 
has been requesting for years, a body more independent to political 
pressures than the BEC (Central Electoral Office). To this point, the BEC 
does not even have a consistent database of elections outcomes 
since 1992 – and there is no such database anywhere else. The only 
solution to the amateurishness and to the negligent manner in which 
elections are organized today is to create an authority that enjoys the 
necessary legal support and resources to avoid such situations.  
2. The major beneficiary of political migration, the PSD, should  realize 
that undemocratic procedures bear also costs, not only profits.  
Political migration needs to be eliminated in the future. However, this 
cannot be achieved through the bill proposed by the government, 
which is anyway at the edge of being unconstitutional. There is no 
need for amending the Constitution or passing an organic law for this. 
We can simply copy a model, which worked successfully for our 
neighbors. Slovakia managed to stop political migration by choosing 
the only possible way. The future members of parliament or future 
mayors signed their resignation with a blank date, agreeing to give up 
their offices once they decide to leave the party. At the same time, 
major political parties concluded a pact and agreed to accept these 
rules. Unless such a decision on behalf of the political parties is there, 
legislative amendments are useless: once the commitment of parties is 
there, there is no need for such amendments anyway. Therefore, SAR is 
calling upon all political parties to modify their internal regulations in 
this respect and respond to the request of the civil society to sign such 
a formal pact. The problem of political migration can be solved 
without changing any law, provided there is a political will to do that.  
3. The CNA should organize a public debate together with specialized 
organization in the field of media and civic education with regard to 
its interference in the electoral campaign. We support the need of 
having a civilized campaign, but this does not include limiting 
democratic debate, as it happened during the  2000 general 
elections and the 2004 local elections. 
4. The D.A. Alliance could have won elections, provided it ran as a single 
entity. Was it worth letting the PSD claim the victory in elections just just 
in order to test the relative force of the two partners and satisfy a 
number of weak party branches? Such local party organizations are 
56
51
54
50 52 54 56 58 60
Elections 1996
Elections 2000
Elections 2004
%
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actually afraid of unification because they fear competition and 
because their ultimate goal is not to win elections, but to further 
pursue their family business within their respective territory. SAR’s 
recommendations are two folded in this respect: 
(i) Based on the analysis of elections performance, there is 
need to discipline all local leaders pursuing a selfish 
behavior, who risk to endanger a victory in general 
elections.  
(ii) Furthermore, there is need to dismiss all those, who have 
‘scientifically’ argued that separate lists would guarantee 
more votes for the Alliance. Provided the Alliance wants 
victory, it needs to create a single professional research 
department for presidential and general elections and give 
up such ‘inspired’ self-declared experts.  
5. PSD should not look for imaginary scapegoats for its partial failure in 
these elections. Mr. Dan Ioan Popescu (leader of the Bucharest party 
branch) or Mircea Geoană are not necessarily to blame. PSD is now 
paying the price for its aggressive language and attitude imposed 
from the very top, a suicidal strategy pursued even these days by the 
same leaders who have a general negative image. Deceptive surveys 
and thinly disguised threats to the media and the civil society were 
issued weekly in press conferences by the top leadership of PSD. 
Therefore, the change in attitude should come from the same level, 
and not by penalizing local organizations. These organizations have 
actually paid for the general image of PSD as a corrupt and arrogant 
ruling party, which was emanated primarily from the center. PSD can 
win a lot if they manage to change this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local  party 
organizations are 
not the first to 
blame for PSD’s 
failure, but its 
aggressive and 
arrogant image 
projected from 
the top 
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FOCUS 
 
 
SABOTAGED TACITLY FROM THE TOP, 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WILL REMAIN 
WEAK 
We need to change not only people, but also 
institutions and processes in order to allow local 
authorities fulfill their mandate from citizens 
Like may other former communist states Romania has embraced after 
1989, out of conviction or just by imitation, the institutional philosophy of 
decentralization. The process was aimed primarily at: 
• Defining the boundaries between local, national and shared functions 
and responsibilities of the state, and thus creating a true space of local 
autonomy in decision-making. 
• And defining a list of local resources that are commensurate with the 
responsibilities of the local governments (LGs), which they can allocate 
and spend in accordance with local needs and priorities. 
Important steps have been made on the second dimension, especially in 
the early nineties, with the passing of the first laws on LGs and local 
revenues; and in 1998-99, when new legislation dealing with local finance 
instituted for the first time in Romania the system of resource sharing based 
on automatic formulas, thus making the local budgetary process more 
autonomous, transparent and predictable.  
However there has been less progress so far not only in addressing, but 
even in understanding the first issue. This is one of the important things we 
want to stress in this material, since it has been often overlooked by both 
practitioners and analysts: that additional local resources and more 
investments in "local capacity" will hardly make a difference for the citizen 
as long as the institutional framework remains fluid, with a substantial 
"informal" component; budgetary process remains volatile (the execution 
tolerates wide deviations from the planned structure); laws and 
regulations are interpreted with extreme "flexibility", including by the 
central government; many intergovernmental financial transfers remain 
opaque and unpredictable; and direct interventions to solve punctual 
crises predominate, at the expense of strategic thinking aimed at allowing 
local actors start dealing themselves with the problems they face. 
Sometimes, indeed, LGs do not have enough resources do take matters in 
their own hands. But, increasingly in the last years, resources cease to be 
the main problem in Romania – instead, our main problem becomes the 
lack of coordination and proper incentives at the local level, which lead 
to inefficient use of existing resources.  
All these factors rule out the consolidating of institutions and stable 
expectations at the local level, and reduce the interest of local actors in 
devising own strategies and local development agendas. No matter how 
Increasingly, the 
main problem is not 
the lack of 
resources but bad 
incentives and lack 
of real autonomy at 
the local level 
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much assistance they are provided, LGs will develop own management 
capacities only when they have an incentive to do so, because they feel 
they gain from it politically or financially, and a stable environment to 
shape their motivation. As long as the gains are higher from other types of 
behavior, such as rent-seeking at the upper levels of governance, their 
participation in programs to "strengthen capacities" and create modern 
management instruments will remain formal, superficial. The problem is 
aggravated by the well-entrenched paternalistic attitude towards LGs in 
the Romanian nation state: they are not regarded as equals of the 
government by top officials and the public, no matter what the law says.  
The Law on Local Public Administration is largely silent on the issue of the 
functions and responsibilities of local governments at all levels. Typically, it 
is the annual State budget law that defines implicitly these functions and 
responsibilities.  Almost every year since 1991, the State budget law has 
added, modified or removed local responsibility for specific services, or for 
certain aspects of these services. Thus, acts which were supposed to be 
purely financial in nature affected substantially – and mostly by default – 
the structure of local government. Responsibilities for expenditures of both 
county and local councils changed frequently and on short notice. Even 
the direction of the change was oftentimes difficult to predict, as the 
responsibility shifted back and forth between the national and local 
governments and between county and local councils. However, the 
typical situation is when new "mandates" (mandatory policies decided 
largely at the center but which have to be implemented by LGs) are 
created overnight and passed down to LGs without much preparation. All 
these lead to a permanent state of semi-crisis at the local level. Two things 
happen in these circumstances which have serious consequences: 
• The natural tendency of the central government is reinforced to 
intervene directly in order to solve temporary crises, through (half-
baked) executive orders or prefectorial hyper-activism. For example, 
Emergency Ordinances imposing caps on the number of staff in LGs; 
or caps on certain types of expenditure even when these are made 
out of own revenues (communication, transportation, etc); or 
attempts to micromanage local funds by higher authorities who know 
better, when there is suspicion that LGs can make mistakes. Thus a 
vicious circle appears: without a clear space of local autonomy and 
responsibility LGs make suboptimal decisions, which lead to crises, 
which in turn lead to even more hasty measures by the center in the 
attempt to fix things by limiting local autonomy even further. 
• Against this background of institutional instability and jumpiness, 
deliberate abuses and politically-biased decisions are more likely to 
happen. 
Two additional factors have further contributed to the impression of 
instability and lack of direction of the decentralization process in Romania. 
First, in spite of the repeated complaints about the lack of managerial 
capacity at the local level, and in spite of the government's official 
strategies to strengthen and rationalize the structure of local authorities, 
small rural communes proliferate by the splitting of the existing ones. The 
latest such move happened earlier this year, when no less than 117 new 
rural local governments were created (and 27 former rural communes 
were upgraded to town status). There is a steady bottom-up pressure 
towards fragmentation in the rural areas to which the central government 
finds it hard to resist in practice, though it has been identified as a problem 
in its own official documents. This tendency will probably continue and 
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create serious economy-of-scale problems in providing services at the 
local level, thus complicating the process of decentralizing social services 
such as education and health care.  
Second, "regionalization" as an issue periodically resurfaces on the public 
discussion agenda, sometimes embraced, sometimes rejected by the 
government, without ever being clear what its proponents mean by the 
term: the setting up of a new tier of local government proper (regions 
Polish-style), and in this case with / our without / the preservation of the 
current 2nd tier (counties); or something else, such as the mere 
strengthening of the current (rather ineffectual) EU-type Regional 
Development Councils. In either case there are precious few details about 
the functions to be performed by the new "regions", while the debate 
tends to focus primarily on symbolic, emotional issues such as their 
boundaries, would-be capitals and coats of arms. The danger in such half-
baked proposals is that, by not being clear about goals, attributions and 
sources of revenues, they open the way for the other tiers of government 
to begin fighting political proxy wars over the design – but especially 
during the stage of implementation – of the new creation, and thus add a 
new layer of dysfunctional institutions on top of the existing ones.  
Structural deficiencies of the current local government system  
The general inconsistent definition of attributions in LGs creates cleavages 
/ points of fracture where inefficiencies, paralysis and political games 
become possible at the local and county level. There are disputes about 
the lines of subordination: (i) within the LG (mayor-council); (ii) between 
tiers of LGs (counties-localities); (iii) between LGs and the deconcentrated 
offices (prefects, offices of ministries). The problems are general, but 
become most visible in cases of political cohabitation (mayor and local or 
county council majority from different parties), which occurs either as a 
result of elections or political migration (councilors switching sides). In 
some cases (Bucharest, Braşov) the tension has escalated in the past years 
up to a point where LGs operations become virtually paralyzed. This 
happened because in Romania the formal administrative institutions are 
weak, and so the main decisions are made informally in the backroom by 
informal party committees.  
The status of the Mayor (elected directly) vis-à-vis the Council (elected on 
party list) and Deputy mayor(s) (elected indirectly, by the council) is not 
clear. The office of the mayor, as LG's executive branch, is not defined as 
a public institution in terms of responsibilities and legal authority, nor is its 
link with the "local community" as a repository of legitimacy clearly 
specified. The definition of the mayor as "the head of LG" is not 
operationalized in the list of functions, and becomes problematic in cases 
of cohabitation. In theory the mayor delegates some functions to deputy 
mayors, elected by the council from among its members, and continues 
to be responsible for what they do. This may lead to unworkable 
arrangements: the Council can pass functions to deputy mayors without 
his agreement, s/he cannot control or discipline them, but continues to be 
responsible for their actions.  
Formally the mayors have no apparatus of their own, their offices 
belonging formally to the local council. Paradoxically, the mayor has little 
say in deciding the structure and staff of the apparatus he works with 
(unless he is able to exert control by informal pressures); but he is required 
to clear-out the staff chart of the deconcentrated services still 
incompletely decentralized, such as education (local schools) and health 
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care (hospitals). The practice of the last years has shown that the Council 
has the authority to strip the mayor of functions, altering radically the 
structure of the LG. Examples are Bucharest, where there were attempts to 
alter the legal status of the mayor's office; or Braşov, the extreme case, 
where the council created a Service for Public Patrimony (SPP) under a 
standing committee of the Council, which took over the most important 
executive functions of the mayor's office, such as managing or privatizing 
local assets and contracting public services. Thus SPP got control over 
more than 50% of the local budget and begun to act as a parallel city hall 
(180 employees, vs. 230 in the city hall). It has authority over 
investment/development local functions, while the mayor's office was left 
responsible mostly with "unappealing" education staff payrolls and social 
protection services. All these could be summarized by saying that the 
Romanian mayor is  
• defined theoretically as "the head of LG", and is politically 
accountable to the community in this capacity;  
• but in practice does not have much more power than a city manager 
appointed by the Council. This dilemma is less visible when there is 
party alignment on both sides and thus a basis for informal 
negotiations exists; and becomes very visible in cases of political 
cohabitation.  
The Local Council's secretaries (top local civil servants) are appointed by 
prefects and report only to them. Thus they represent an element of 
control / de facto subordination / of LGs to the central government 
represented by the prefect, in spite of the letter of the Constitution which 
postulates that no such subordination should exist. There are cases where 
the official contest for the position of secretary has been blocked for 
years. As a result the persons appointed by the prefect for this position 
function as interim secretary and does not even have civil servant status, 
thus lacking the minimal protection against political pressure associated 
with this status (in Braşov there were 7 such interim secretaries rotated by 
the prefect in this position in the last six years).  
The secretaries are important at the local and county level, since they can 
undermine in practice the actions of the local authority they are supposed 
to serve (i) by action; and (ii) non-action, whether intended or due to 
incompetence, without being formally responsible for their action / non-
action. For example the secretary can give legal clear-out to decisions 
which are subsequently sued in court by the prefect as illegal. In such 
situations mayors are threatened with suspension from office when 3 such 
cases are initiated, but nothing happens to the secretaries who are 
appointed by the prefect and responsible to them for failing to perform 
the legal screening, which is actually their main duty. 
Prefects have the main constitutional attribution to control the legality of 
the decisions made by local / county councils or mayors. But there is no 
proper mechanism to ensure the accountability of the prefect in this 
respect, and no single precedent where prefects were held accountable 
for their actions/non-actions. There is strong evidence that (i) there is 
political bias in the prefects' actions (Giurgiu, where almost all LC decisions 
are invariably sued by the prefect, allegedly in order to paralyze its 
activity), but especially non-action (ex. Braşov, in well-known cases of 
conflict of interest among local councilors); (ii) the prefects are far more 
active vis-à-vis local authorities (1st tier) than county councils, even when 
there are well-known irregularities at the county level (ex. the distribution 
of the equalization funds, which has always been done by in breach of 
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the Annual Budget Law provisions). Briefly, the prefects can choose not to 
initiate action against cases of their choice, without being held 
responsible for this selective enforcement of the law. Their relationship with 
the County Councils is a clear case of institutional capture of the regulator 
by the regulated.  
Financial problems 
The financial relations between central and local governments do not 
currently support the clear delimitation of a space of local autonomy and 
responsibility, but paternalism from the center and ad-hoc solutions. It is 
true that many LGs do not have enough managerial capacity of their 
own. But on the other hand, one of the reasons why they are so slow in 
developing it is that the current institutional arrangement does not reward 
with proper incentives the emergence of local capacity, and instead 
encourages case-by-case "negotiations" and rent-seeking.  
The local budget process continues to have the biggest adverse impact 
on the autonomy of county – but especially local – councils. With the 
approval of the State budget, often as late as February of March of a 
fiscal year that runs from January to December, each local government 
can adopt its own budget for the year. First, however, they must adjust 
their draft budget in accordance with the rules set forth in the current 
State budget law. In each year since 1991 this has included changes in 
the expenditure responsibilities of both local and county councils. It also 
has included variations in the volume and type of transfers, both general 
and earmarked. In addition, the local councils must wait for the county 
council to allocate to each one of them their corresponding share of the 
equalization grants received by the county council from the State budget. 
Briefly put, Local Councils face the absurd situation of having to wait for 
the Parliament to pass the State Budget in November-December, then for 
the Ministry of Finance to tell counties how much money they get from 
transfers, then for county councils to decide who gets what (and if the 
allocation rules which in principle are mandatory are applied or not), and 
only then they can meet and finalize the local budgets. It is practically 
impossible to be ready with it before January 1st when the fiscal year 
begins. If they move fast and there are no substantial discussions on the 
budget they may be ready in February-March.  
There are two additional problems here which have made the local 
budgetary process more awkward, opaque and irrational than it should 
be. First, money are transferred from the center in two steps, first to 
counties which in turn distribute them by localities, even for those functions 
that are hundred percent local. Since all public institutions in Romania use 
the Treasury system there is no technical problem to send formula-based 
funds directly to localities, thus eliminating the unnecessary intermediation 
of County Councils/presidents. The second problem, which derives from 
the first, is that the allocation process typically displays different patterns in 
each of the 41 counties − which sometimes runs squarely against the 
provisions of the Annual National Budget Law. Even tough, according to 
the text of ANBL, counties should strictly apply the fiscal capacity formula 
when distributing the general-purpose equalization grants, deviations from 
this standard are tolerated on a large scale. There has been no case of a 
prefect suing a County Council in court for breaking this money 
distribution rule. No local council knows for sure what amount they will 
receive from the county council. The process typically involves significant 
individual ‘negotiation’ between the local officials and the county 
council.  
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The same conclusion applies to the allocation of the other transfer funds, 
particularly those for investments, and to the relation between counties 
and the central government. Fig. 1 below describes the allocation by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Money for county and local roads, transfers from the Ministry 
of Transportation, 2001-2003; Total sum = aprox 190 mil USD
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county of the money from the Special Roads Fund, which is supposed to 
be based purely on objective technical criteria1, performed by the Ministry 
of Transportation and Public Works (MPWT). Obviously, it is not, and the 
deviations from the norm are so wide that suspicions of rent seeking and 
favoritism at the central level seem to be well grounded2. When signal 
such as this are given from the top, it is hard to expect improvements at 
the local level in terms of more responsibility, self-reliance and 
accountability. 
Rural communes, who are generally most in need, are the most likely to 
suffer from this erratic distributions of funds. On average, they are far more 
dependent on the transfers from the State budget than the towns and 
municipalities or the county council. In this context, it is not surprising that 
elected officials in many communes – the mayor and the members of the 
local council – have adopted largely a passive attitude regarding 
governance. Their most important skill is the ability to "negotiate" with the 
county council to secure the highest possible allocation. Overall, we can 
summarize the history of fiscal decentralization in Romania by saying that 
County Councils were allowed to "confiscate" for themselves most of the 
space of local autonomy created by the central government in the last 
years, and now they exert this autonomy at the expense of localities 
whenever a conflict between tiers occurs.  
STEPS TO REFORM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM: AN AGENDA FOR 2005 
AND THE FOLLOWING YEARS 
Urgent steps need to be taken to address the problems mentioned 
before. However, we believe this is unlikely to happen in 2004, even 
though public administration reform (PAR) is pressed by Brussels and 
presumably high on the government agenda, because:  
• PAR is a sensitive and politicized subject and the current Romanian 
government, besides making promises and publishing fine strategies, 
has shown little appetite for real action; it is unlikely that things will 
change now, after the surprisingly poor performance of PSD in the 
June local elections;  
• The deputy prime-minister in charge with PAR is currently running for 
the office of mayor in Cluj; in case he wins an interim minister will 
probably fill in for him, while if he loses he will come back just in time for 
the long summer holidays, before the campaign for national elections 
begins in September; in both situations there will be little time and 
attention for the process of decentralization, a task that cannot be 
delegated to junior ministers because it requires active support and 
coordination from the top cabinet level; 
• While in other policy areas the technical know how is more or less 
available, the only problem being political will and coordinating 
implementation, in decentralization (a non-acquis subject) there is no 
ready-made template of reforms; various international partners often 
come with different plans, some better than others, based on clashing 
visions of the local public administration; once more, a strong  
                                                 
1 More precisely, on three such indicators: length of roads, their technical 
condition, and the volume of traffic.  
2 The two main winners, Bacău and Vrancea, are the counties of the Secretary of 
State and the Minister who decide on the distribution, respectively.  
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domestic capacity to coordinate actions is necessary. 
This is why we believe we cannot expect major achievements in the area 
of PAR this year. On the contrary: hasty, politically-motivated attempts 
and half-baked changes are likely to do more harm than good. The 
agenda for action outlined below is therefore primarily meant to be 
considered by the new government resulted from the November 2004 
elections, whatever its political composition.  
1. Amendments to the current legislation dealing with LGs are necessary, 
in order to clarify the relation between (i) mayors and local councils; 
(ii) local governments and the central government, with special 
attention paid to the office of the prefect. This is a broad, but urgent 
requirement, and it must be transposed in concrete steps such as 2-6 
below, not empty promises or vague, inapplicable legal texts. 
2. The elements of para-legal, informal subordination of lower LGs by 
higher level authorities should be reduced to a minimum, by combing 
thoroughly the existing legislation. Council secretaries should become 
full local civil servants, decoupled from the office of the prefect, hired 
and fired by the local authorities under the law that regulates their 
profession (conditions of studies, seniority, etc).  
3. Crucially, any new piece of legislation must be consistent with the 
broader policy goals, not run against them. For example, there are 
provisions in the draft Law of Prefects adopted by the cabinet last 
month and sent to the parliament which introduce a de facto 
"opportunity control" by the appointed prefects over the decisions 
made by elected local councils (and not just "legality control" as it has 
been the case until now)3. Adopting such a law, and in the same time 
publishing a strategy purportedly aimed at "enlarging local 
autonomy", is nothing else but inconsistent policy. Moreover, we 
believe these provisions clash with art. 122 of the Constitution, which 
states that there should be no element of subordination between the 
elected tiers of government. The Law of Prefects, item on the famous 
"to-do list" submitted to Brussels, should be therefore withdrawn and 
amended by the government. In its current form it is likely to be 
blocked in the Parliament or end up before the Constitutional Court.  
4. Other similar bad ideas should be dropped for good. In the last years 
there have been repeated attempts to enact a National Code of 
Conduct for local officials (mayors and councilors). The drafts 
discussed included provisions under which locally elected people 
could be suspended, or permanently revoked from office through 
administrative procedures only, outside the judicial system, by assorted 
"committees" made up of upper tier representatives, prefects and 
other central government officials, plus a number of fellow mayors 
from the same county (presumably members of FALR leadership). If 
passed, such a Code would open the way for politically motivated 
abuse.  
5. Substantial changes in the local government structure – the passing of 
attributions from mayors to councils or the other way, or creating 
innovative structures like the "metropolitan regions" – should be 
                                                 
3 The prefect "participates in… establishing the local socio-economic 
development plan"… and "establishes, together with the local authorities, the 
priorities of territorial development". (art. 24-g). Also mentioned are "orders issued 
by the prefect in his capacity as County Council President (?!)" (art. 33).  
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carefully designed, discussed and agreed with all the stakeholders, 
and enacted so as to take effect only beginning with the following 
electoral cycle. It is perfectly Ok to experiment with different local 
arrangements – and also let the LGs themselves do it – but situations 
should be avoided when adjustments are temporary and politically 
motivated, leading to instability and dysfunctional structures. 
6. Similarly, the government should make up their mind once for all what 
they mean by "regionalization" and what they intend to do about it. 
When a clear plan is drafted, preferably in the form of a White Paper, 
enough time should be allowed for all interested parties to discuss and 
give feed-back on it. As we made clear on several occasions, SAR is 
against the idea of creating regions as a new intermediary tier of 
government in Romania, because they would do little to address the 
current weaknesses of the LG system, as many people believe, while 
creating new problems of rent-seeking and coordination. But we 
accept that there may be merits in such proposals that we fail to see 
for the moment (it would be extremely helpful if the initiators, 
government officials or civic groups, could pull themselves together 
and put their proposals in written form). What is not acceptable is to 
cook such plans secretly in ministerial offices and pass them in haste 
through emergency ordinance, as it usually happens in Romania; or 
fuel speculation with oblique public statements by ministers when 
there is no serious reform concept behind them. 
7. The local budgetary process should be made more independent and 
rational, in two ways. First, LGs should be free to decide, adopt and 
start implementing the part of the budget based on own revenues 
without waiting the go-ahead from the central government. Local 
budgets will thus have an "insulated" component completely 
decoupled from the national budgeting cycle, ready to become 
effective on January 1st. Second, it should be mandated by law that 
the transfers for LGs included in the national budget should follow a 
fast-track of approval both in Cabinet and the Parliament, so that they 
are adopted by, say, October 15th. This will give Local Councils enough 
time to discuss and adopt their full budgets before the new fiscal year 
begins. The current budget calendar is absurd, since it makes 
physically impossible for LGs to have a budget before the legal 
deadline of January 1st. 
8. Financial transfers from the central government should be made as 
much as possible objective and automatic, either in the form of tax 
shares or through formula-based allocations. A convincing step in this 
direction would be to move with the financing of pre-university 
education, after years of preparations and delays, towards a per-
capita grant system. Similar changes can be made subsequently with 
the current transfers financing various social security mandates; or 
when substantial parts of the health care will be decentralized. 
However, rules like these must not only be adopted, but also enforced 
with determination in order to prevent situations like the one shown in 
Fig. 1 where narrow interest groups break the law and used public 
funds discretionarily. 
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9. Following the clear separation of functions between the two tiers of 
LG, County Councils should be excluded from the allocation of the 
general-purpose equalization grants and those transfers which finance 
purely local functions. Equalization sums should be divided from the 
beginning into two pools of funds – for counties, and for localities – 
and sent directly to the end user by the Ministry of Finance, based on 
the objective formula specified in law. Their intermediation is 
unneccesary and serves only to create patronage power at the 
county level. Otherwise, the danger is high that people who were 
rejected by voters in their localities in the June local ballot will move 
one level up at the County Council and continue to dictate local 
policies as presidents or deputy-presidents.  
10.  For those special funds or national programs administered by ministries 
where distribution based on automatic formulas is not possible, an 
open system of competition with projects should be institutionalized. 
LGs should apply for money publicly and the boards evaluating the 
quality of proposals should be broad, including experts from outside 
ministries (domestic, or technical advisors  from the World Bank, EU 
countries or other bilateral assistance programs). Since we are talking 
about Romanian public money, all applications, successful and 
unsuccessful, must be archived and open to the public.  
11.  The transparency of the budget executions should be improved, and 
the most relevant data should be released ex officio, in order to make 
the whole LG system more accountable, for example on the web 
pages of the institutions. It is unacceptable that financial data like the 
one presented here in Fig. 1 are usually squeezed out from ministries 
with great difficulty, based on the Freedom of Information Act4. 
Daylight is the best disinfectant for public funds. 
12. Finally, official commitments incorporated in strategies or legislative 
acts are credible only if they are backed by political signals from the 
top that the government takes their own rules seriously, follows up on 
them with concrete actions and punishes without discrimination those 
who deviate from the norm. Until now the acts of the central 
government have been inconsistent in this respect – for example by 
promising to depoliticize administration and reduce the number of 
small rural LGs when in practice they are doing the opposite, or by 
tolerating erratic distribution and use of public funds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 After we made them public some members of the Parliament thanked us 
because they had never been to get access to such data before.  
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FOCUS 
 
 
ROMANIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
A few years ago, Romania, like other Central European countries, started 
negotiations and preparations for joining the European Union (EU). In the 
telecommunications industry this means adopting the acquis 
communautaire based on competition (the EU liberalized 
telecommunications on January 1st, 1998), and building an infrastructure 
compatible with that of the EU countries.  Since then Romania closed 
negotiations on Chapter 19 and absorbed the EU directives, but these 
actions alone do not guarantee success. 
Unlike Romania the EU countries fare much better in terms of telecom 
infrastructure. Moreover, they benefit from the substantial experience of 
the market liberalization in the last years. Transposing the EU legislation in 
Romania was the easy part; implementation is going to be more difficult; 
but overcoming the backwardness of the Romanian infrastructure is the 
really daunting task, since in this respect Romania is currently one of the 
least developed countries in Central Europe. Due to late reforms and a 
lack of understanding of the market mechanisms governing 
telecomunications, the industry, even with an evolution above the 
average of the economy,  was not able to keep up with its counterparts in 
neighboring countries. 
What should be done to close this digital divide in a period when the fixed 
telephony in Europe is in recession? First, we should stop treating the fixed 
telephony as a social service and introduce more substantial market 
incentives. Second, we should promote fair competition between various 
sectors of the industry – mobile and fixed operators. Last but not least, 
Romania should invest heavily in connecting the rural areas. Without 
proper infrastructure all the fine-looking strategies of the government – e-
education, e-government, e-society – will remain empty buzzwords.  
 
POOR TELECOM INFRASTRUCTURE  
Romania delayed the reform in telecommunications for too long while the 
applied sectoral strategy positioned fixed telephony as a social service. 
The outcome was one of the weakest infrastructure in Europe, creating a 
gap too wide to be rapidly bridged. 
Due to this delayed reform and lack of understanding of 
telecommunications economics, Romania has nowadays one of the 
lowest fixed line penetration in Central Europe despite the fact that in 1989 
the country was well ranked ahead of Hungary and Poland. (Fig.1) 
Romania's penetration rate for fixed line telephony is about 20%, while in 
rural areas, where 47% of the population lives, fixed lines penetration is 
only 10%. There are many rural localities with no phone line (2 140 without 
fixed telephony, 993 without mobile coverage, 260 without fixed and 
In 1989 Romania 
had a higher 
penetration rate 
than Hungary or 
Poland, but has 
fallen behind ever 
since due to 
delayed reforms 
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mobile telephony). Also, investment costs in rural networks are much 
higher than those in urban areas, with difficult investment recovery due to 
the poverty in rural areas. According to European Directive 2002/22/EC, 
member states shall grant telephony services to all end-users in their 
territory, independently of geographical location. For Romania, this means 
installing telephony networks in all villages with no phone connection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing the Romanian and EU telecommunication infrastructure one 
could find significant differences, which are due to general economic 
conditions and delayed reforms. Low tariffs left the national operator, 
RomTelecom, without sufficient revenues for a running a functional 
system5. A common feature of all East European countries, including 
Romania, was that political pressure to maintain low tariffs prevented 
national operators from rapidly expanding the network. If governments 
had not intervened with substantial subsidies, lower revenues would have 
contributed to poor quality of service and long waiting lists. Where 
privatization was delayed, the development of telecommunications 
infrastructures was slower. By privatization, the state offered a long 
monopoly period, a ‘price cap’ formula for increasing tariffs taking into 
account inflation and an increase in real terms was used in Europe: 
Hungary (Matav) and Czech Republic (Cesky Telecom). In Hungary, a 
very well prepared privatization process led both to a high selling price 
and a doubling of fixed lines penetration in four years: from 14.5% in 1993 
(Matav privatization) to 30.4% in 1997. This is the result of large 
infrastructure investments, sustained also by increases in Average Revenue 
Per User (ARPU).  
Why did Romania, in 1989 a country better placed than Hungary and 
Poland from the point of view of fixed lines density, become a laggard? 
The answer is delayed reform, in telecommunications but not only.  
                                                 
5 Roger Noll, Telecommunications reform in Romania, 2000 
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Hungary, a frontrunner in telecommunications restructuring in the 
region 
Hungary is an example of timely reform in telecommunications. In January 
1989 the regulatory body was set up, while the national operator, Matav, 
was established on January 1st, 1990, after separating postal and radio 
services. On December 31st, 1991, Matav became a joint stock company, 
owned by the Ministry for Privatization, in charge with management, 
restructuring and privatization. On November 23rd, 1992, the Hungarian 
Parliament passed the telecommunications law, enacted in April 1994. 
Hungary was divided into 54 operative zones, out of which 29 were 
reserved for Matav, 25 being the object of competition: 10 were awarded 
to Matav, while the remaining ones to companies from Israel, Switzerland, 
Portugal, France, and USA.   
The privatization of Matav started in 1992. In September 1993, the offer for 
sale of 30% of Matav shares was launched. Matav privatization was 
sustained by world financial institutions through convertible loans made by 
auction announcement: IFC – US$30m and EBRD – US$60m. In December 
1993, Magyarcom consortium (Deutsche Telekom, 50%, and Ameritech, 
50%) was declared winner, despite the fact that their offer at US$875m, 
was lower than the one of Stet and Bell Atlantic (US$910m). Deutsche 
Telekom’s experience in East Germany was appreciated positively. For 
investments made, IFC and EBRD received 1%, respectively 2% of Matav 
shares.  
The winner received the company’s control, concession for 25 years, eight 
years monopoly for long distance services, as well as, the task to maintain 
a yearly 15% growth of phone lines, and a 6 months waiting time in 1997. 
By the year-end 1993, Hungary had 1.2m lines and 14.5% penetration, 
while yearly ARPU was US$393. Matav privatization valued company to 
US$2.92bn, namely US$2,412 per line, much over the value of a line in USA, 
US$1,428, or in UK’s British Telecom, US$1,710. The success was the result of 
the early preparation of the company and a proper strategy.  
In February 1993, seven months prior the auction and after a 15% increase 
of tariffs in real terms, the Hungarian government announced the ‘price-
cap’ rule to automatically increase tariffs taking into account inflation, as 
well as costs. They chose the ‘price-cap’ formula as it stimulates 
investments and reduces uncertainty regarding the company’s future 
cash flows. One should also take into account that at the time there were 
few shares for sale in national operators, thus the demand/supply ratio 
was quite unbalanced. In December 1995, Hungary sold 37% of Matav 
shares to Magyarcom for US$852m, valuing the company at US$2.3bn. 
Matav was listed and in November 1997 the initial public offering (IPO) 
was launched, by selling a 26.2% stake in Matav. As a result, the state 
obtained US$1.017bn and the company was valued at US$3.9bn. By the 
end of 2002, the state owned only the golden share, the majority 
shareholder being Deutsche Telekom with 59.2%.  
The results? First of all, a boost of fixed line penetration from 14.5% in 1993 
to 34.5% in 1998 and an average yearly growth of 9%, due to a 
US$500m/year investment. Secondly, waiting list disappeared (0.785m in 
December 1993), and the old analogical exchanges were replaced by 
1998. All these were possible due to the ‘price-cap’ formula, which 
created incentives for an investment intensive policy. The company’s 
efficiency also improved: from 90 lines/employee in 1994 to 190 
lines/employee in 1998, and 351 lines/employee in 2003. What is more, in 
The recipe of 
Hungarian success: 
early privatisation, 
tough competition, 
foreign investments, 
and use of the 
"price-cap" formula 
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those times mobile telephony was in its infancy, so investments in 
telecommunications were directed mainly toward fixed telephony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Romania, a case study in delayed reforms  
By contrast, Romania is an example of how reform should not be done. In 
July 1990, the Ministry of Communications was established, and in 
September 1990 Rom Post Telecom was set up as the 
telecommunications, radio-communications and postal operator. 
According to government decision no. 448/June 27th, 1991, the regie 
autonomă RomTelecom, Poşta Română, Radiocomunicaţii and General 
Inspectorate for Communications (IGC) were established as distinct 
entities.  
The national operator, RomTelecom, was established through government 
decision no. 448/1991, inheriting most of the assets of former Rom Post 
Telecom. Through government decision no. 673/October 25th, 1997, 
RomTelecom became National Telecommunications Company, a joint 
stock company with ROL1.958bn share capital (19,580,029 shares with 
ROL100,000 nominal value), owned by Romanian State and represented 
by the Ministry of Communications.   
After a long privatization process started early in 1997, on December 30th, 
1998 (five years after the Matav privatization), Greece’s OTE paid US$675m 
for a 35% stake in RomTelecom and 16% voting rights. This deal valued 
RomTelecom at US$1.93bn or US$540/line (privatization of national 
operators in Hungary in 1993 or Czech Republic in 1995 led to 
US$2,400/line). The remaining stake, 65%, was owned by the Romanian 
state, of which 5% were to be sold to company employees by May 31st, 
2000, IPO being also planned. In terms of managing RomTelecom, OTE 
concluded a contract with GTE allowing the US firm to negotiate a stake in 
company within two years. EBRD also had an option to buy a stake in 
RomTelecom, but none of these two options were exercised.  
The second phase in privatizing RomTelecom started late in 2002, during 
the company’s cash crisis and at a moment when the world 
Fig. 2. Mobile penetration in Central Europe (%)
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telecommunications crisis reached its peak, being concluded on March 
3rd, 2003, when OTE transferred in Romania’s accounts US$30.99m, for a 
3.12% stake in RomTelecom. The entire transaction, valued at US$274m, 
consisted in a share capital increase entirely subscribed by OTE and an 
acquisition of a 3.12% stake for US$30.99m. After this transaction, OTE 
became majority shareholder owning a 54.01% stake. A government 
decision on the privatization of RomTelecom, released on December 18th, 
2002, approved the transformation of the golden share owned by 
Romanian State into a common share. On December 20th, 2002, the 
Romanian Senate approved the sale of RomTelecom stake, while on 
January 22nd, 2003 OTE’s Board of Directors approved the transaction, as 
well. During this transaction it was accepted that the company valued 
US$750m (namely US$175/line) before share capital increase.   
After take-over, a long and hesitating restructuring process began, with 
changes in organization (structure, culture and people), as well as in 
strategy (services, tariffs, partnership, etc.). A new organization is now 
emerging, with an emphasis on quality, efficiency and customer care. 
Personnel reduction was continuous during the past years, with 6,700 cuts 
in 2003 to 23,870 employees, while 2004 will bring 3,500 more job cuts.  
In 1998, a Government decision established the ‘price-cap’ formula for 
tariff adjustment, permitting changes in response to inflation or ROL 
depreciation, and an increase in real terms with up to 5%/year. 
Accordingly, in 1999 RomTelecom operated quarterly tariff increases but 
due to strong criticism in 2000 the practice was abandoned. As a result, 
RomTelecom reduced tariffs in real terms in last years: 11.4% in 2000; 10.2% 
in 2001; 6% in 2002 and 9.7% in 2003, relative to inflation. The ‘price-cap’ 
formula, which successfully contributed to doubling fixed line penetration 
in four years in Hungary, was forgotten. Moreover, until October 2003 
RomTelecom was the only ‘player’ with tariffs denominated in ROL, all the 
others (mobile operators, cable TV operators, ISPs and even IGC) having 
tariffs denominated in US$, and, consequently, revenues protected 
against inflation. To this, it has to be added that, after more than a year 
from liberalization, RomTelecom could not rebalance its tariffs, being 
forced by competition to reduce long distance (interurban and 
international) tariffs, without increasing local tariffs accordingly. In 
Romania, as well as in all countries before liberalization, higher long 
distance tariffs were used to subsidize lower local tariffs. Nowadays low 
local tariffs mean lower revenues for fixed telephony in Romania and, 
accordingly, poor investment capacity, and low attractiveness for local 
market.  
Since 1990 Romanian fixed telephony had a slower evolution compared 
to other European countries -- lower technical performance and 
penetration, poor quality of service -- due to low tariffs, insufficient for 
supporting development, the monopoly and political pressure. In this 
period, Romanian fixed telephony was positioned as a social service, 
resulting in one of the poorest telecom infrastructure in Central Europe.   
Preparing for liberalization, a new telecommunication law was passed in 
2002. Late in September 2002 the telecommunications regulatory body 
(ANRC) was established and struggled to create an effective 
implementation of the new European regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, a stable legal environment to encourage competition 
and to stimulate investments. The EU directives were adopted, the 
authorization process being simplified and some 2,200 entities asked for 
authorization according to the new law.  
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LIBERALIZATION, ONE YEAR AFTER 
Strangely enough, the first year of liberalization meant the highest 
increase, of 2,000,000, in ... mobile telephony subscriber base, and the 
lowest increase, of 120,000, for ... the liberalized fixed telephony market. 
The year when mobile telephony subscribers rose by 2m to over 7m, 
brought another paradox – the failure CosmoRom, the first failure among 
GSM operators in Europe and maybe in world. Where the Romanian state 
was not involved in shareholders structure, companies did well. Other 
reasons behind these could be the lack of market regulating mechanisms, 
or, maybe, the existence of still imperfect mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The liberalization of telecommunications seems to have had an 
inappropriate timing in Romania. First of all, it occurred too late, when the 
mobile telephony boom strongly decreased the interest for fixed line 
business. Also, liberalization appeared in the context of world 
telecommunication crisis, which strongly reduced telecom investments 
and made financing a difficult task. One should also consider the fixed 
telephony recession in USA and Europe – subscribers base and turnover 
decreasing continuously. Also, even in Central European countries, with a 
macroeconomic status weaker than the EU, classical fixed telephony 
entered a crisis.  
The post-liberalization landscape seems to be not so interesting, as long as 
two markets, local and interurban – accounting for 80-90% of total 
turnover have few competitors. But the situation is not completely dull 
either, as the international market is very active: numerous competitors, 
most of them with small turnover, are fighting to arbitrate, as long as 
possible, between RomTelecom tariffs and VoIP tariffs in a price sensitive 
market. The result: a dramatic decrease of international tariffs and a slight 
increase of local tariffs – all too far from tariff rebalancing. The Romanian 
government is also intending to spur competition on the liberalized 
market, more precisely three ministries (MCIT, MLPTL, MCE), are each trying 
to launch their own operator: POSTelecom, Telecomunicatii CFR, Teletrans. 
Late in 2003, the first two competitors on local market commercially 
launched telephony services: Atlas Telecom (Oradea, November 17th) 
and Astral Telecom (Bucharest, Galati, Brăila and Cluj,  
Spectacular 
growth of mobile 
phone users, 
failure of 
CosmoRom, the 
lowest growth rate 
of fixed phone 
users 
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Fig. 4. Telephony penetration in Romania (%)
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December 3rd). On April 6th, 2004, RCS/RDS also launched their fixed line 
services. By the end of 2003, telephony penetration in Romania was 53%, 
out of which 32.6% represents mobile telephony contribution. In 2003, in 
Romania the optical backbone networks length totaled about 40,000 Km, 
RomTelecom being the leader on market, followed by Telecomunicaţii 
CFR and RCS. (Fig.5.) Radiocomunicaţii also operates a 2,500 Km radio-
relay backbone network. For time being the existing networks seem 
sufficient for current usage. 
Romanian telecommunications turnover has continuously increased in 
past years, the growth engine being the mobile telephony, more precisely 
the GSM900 operators (Connex and Orange). Together, they account for 
US$1.06bn, namely about 50% of total Romanian telecommunications 
turnover. If turnover from cable TV and Internet (totally owned by private 
capital) is added, one could see a decreasing weight of state capital in 
Romanian telecommunications turnover. 
ROMANIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN 2004 
Mobile telephony will continue to be the engine of Romanian 
telecommunications. The GSM900 operators, where Romanian state is not 
a shareholder, will continue to consolidate their market positions, 
increasingly providing their clients with bundled services (voice, data, 
Internet - fixed and mobile) to RomTelecom’s detriment, being in a better 
position for convergence.  
In 2004 mobile telephony will continue to have a two-digit growth - 15% - 
25%, thus by the end of the year the number of subscribers will be over 8m, 
while tariffs are expected to continuously decrease. However, without a 
special interest in 3G, it is possible that in 2004 four 3G licenses will be 
awarded. It is most probably that this will happen after the revitalization of 
CosmoRom in order to have four mobile operators for the four licenses. In 
all likelihood GSM900 operators will buy 3G licenses using UMTS 
technology, a technology without special results in region. Before 
December 2003, Hungary postponed the award of 3G licenses for 2005. 
The reasons consisted in lack of interest, unprepared market, and 
technological problems. Romania could also learn from this experience. 
The electoral year could be a chance for the rescue of CosmoRom, but a 
decision should be taken rapidly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The GSM900 operators 
will continue to be the 
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Fixed telephony will continue its modest evolution with slight (<5%) 
increases in the number of subscribers, while the industry turnover could 
continue to decrease. (Fig.6) Competition on the international market will 
continue to be strong, while the arbitrage (between RomTelecom 
unbalanced tariffs and VoIP tariffs), very attractive in 2003, will become 
less and less attractive, due to increased competition. This could create 
problems, mainly for small companies (ISPs), paving the way for failures, 
mergers, and acquisitions. At this time, competition on domestic long 
distance market would be welcome. It would be time for 
Radiocomunicaţii, Telecomunicaţii CFR, Teletrans to enter the market, and 
this could trigger tariffs reduction. Once again RomTelecom could be in a 
delicate situation being forced to reduce its interurban tariffs without 
increasing accordingly local tariffs.  
Probably, Telecomunicaţii CFR and Teletrans will continue to develop their 
optical backbone networks, even if the existing backbone network seems 
to be enough for current needs. Already, one heard voices speaking on 
the surplus in transport capacity in Romania and even on future failures. 
Bankruptcies in telecommunications throughout the world affected mainly 
carriers, their effects being supported by private capital, not public funds. 
This scenario might not be repeated in Romania, taking into account 
shareholders’ structure, namely the presence of the state. Anyhow, the life 
on the long-distance market will not be easy, surprises can be expected, 
and a solution to avoid them is privatization by attracting a strategic 
partner and investment funds. Evolution towards a full service provider 
(local and long distance, data, voice, etc.) using low investments 
technologies could be another solution for risk reduction, but it assumes 
partnerships with other competitors and thus requires time.  
Telecomunicaţii CFR and Teletrans operate backbone networks providing 
a package of services to a closed group of users. Restructuring these 
companies, transformation of network administration into a business, is a 
complex process, which should be rapidly done. There is an umbilical cord 
limiting evolution of these companies, while cutting it, by privatization via 
attracting a strategic partner, could accelerate the companies’ 
evolution. A strategic partner will not only bring the industry expertise, but 
also access to international finances. Presence of investment funds in 
shareholders structure is guarantee for increasing the company’s market 
value on medium term, while also acting as antibodies, both very 
important for a new entrant on liberalized market. Prior to privatization, 
Radiocomunicaţii should be reorganized separating state interests (TV and 
radio broadcasting) from the ones addressing the market.  
Atlas Telecom, Astral Telecom and RCS/RDS have commercially launched 
their services, thus users have now the chance of an alternative to 
RomTelecom’s services and of comparing service quality. Romanians 
have the opportunity to see how these technologies work, while Romania 
could continue to be a trial field for new technologies (wireless/WLL 
mainly). So, new players could enter the market using cheap access 
technologies (WLL), providing telephony with limited mobility. In 2004 one 
could expect the boom of limited mobility telephony, a service placed 
between fixed and mobile telephony, and which had a huge success in 
India. There, it was launched as mobile telephony for poor population and 
thus it could be a solution for Romanians, which also are not too rich.  
POSTelecom might enter the market this year too, the last announced 
deadline for commercial launch being autumn 2004. POSTelecom could 
benefit from the presence of China Unicom in its shareholders structure, 
Telecomunicaţii 
CFR, Teletrans  and 
Radiocomunicatii
must be urgently 
restructured; they 
need a strategic 
partner and and/or 
of investment funds  
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having the advantage of a business built from scratch: using latest 
technologies (IP centric network, lower investment/line comparing to 
classical telephony, lower operational costs, etc.), hiring necessary 
personnel (number, skills, etc.), and building a market-oriented 
organization. POSTelecom has the disadvantage to have the Romanian 
state as a (majority) shareholder. It is also interesting to see the impact of a 
Chinese product, 29% at the beginning, on a price sensitive market using 
western products. Very important will be the cooperation among 
shareholders. Success is also depending on the speed of network 
deployment and business development, as well as on the package of 
provided services, quality, and tariffs. But, for time being… 
In the conditions in which RomTelecom will not have permission to 
rebalance its tariffs its revenues will continue to decrease. RomTelecom 
operates a ‘capital-intensive’ and ‘labor-intensive’ network, a voice-
centric network, with expensive operation and providing only a limited 
package of services. This is a reason for RomTelecom to lose ground in 
favor of its competitors using modern technologies. Another problem is a 
modest evolution of its mobile arm, CosmoRom, more precisely a too 
much delayed restructuring. RomTelecom is a unique case in Europe, 
being the only national operator without a strong mobile telephony arm - 
mobile telephony representing less than 2% in total group turnover, 
compared to 40% in Hungary’s Matav, or OTE. CosmoRom needs a 
strategic partner, a mobile telephony operator with at least a regional 
strategy, able to build a new business model; an operator able to 
compete with Orange, Vodafone, TIW and to provide easy access to 
international financing. The partner should bring affiliation to a strong 
telecommunications group. The decrease in RomTelecom revenues could 
be compensated by costs cuts, as a result of company’s restructuring, so 
an increase in company’s efficiency is expected.  
Competing technologies in the local loop 
Two technologies were competing in Romania before market 
liberalization: classical fixed telephony and mobile telephony, especially 
GSM900. Penetration of these two technologies was similar by the time of 
liberalization, but currently mobile telephony has a higher increase rate 
(two digits). After liberalization, a third technology – cable TV, existing in 
Romania since 1990, became a potential competitor, and after the 
commercial launch of Astral Telecom and RCS telephony services this 
technology became a real competitor. In November 2003, Atlas Telecom 
launched telephony services using DECT technology, a wireless access 
technology (WLL), while other WLL technologies might also be expected.  
Which one of these technologies will succeed in a price sensitive market? 
Certainly, the ‘cheapest’ technologies. With US$600/line, the RomTelecom 
technology is by far the most disadvantaged. If taking into consideration 
the existing tariffs, the disadvantage is much higher. Potential market is 
much larger (80-90% of population) for wireless technologies addressing 
individuals, compared to wire technologies (35-40%) addressing families. 
(Tab. 1) That is why the growth is much higher for wireless technologies, 
and the future seems to belong to them.     
 
 
 
 
Due to the 
Cosmorom failure 
RomTelecom 
became unique in 
Europe: the only 
national company 
without a strong 
mobile telephony 
branch 
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Tab. 1 
Techology/Company CDMA450 
(Zapp) 
GSM    
900 
Fixed 
Tel (RT) 
CATV DECT 
(Atlas) 
Potential market population population families famillies population 
Marginal investment 
($/line) 
 200–300 > 600 200-400 ~100 (?) 
Local tariffs in PH ($/min) ~0.02 ~0.10 ~0.03  0.03 
Interurban tariffs 
(US$/min) 
~0.02 ~0.10 ~0.10  0.03 
Revenue in 2003 
(US$/line) 
~ 300 ~200 ~200 50 (Tv)  
Growth in 2003 (mil./%) 0.14 2m/40% 0.12/3%   
Turnover in 2003 ($ m) 48 1060 825 150  
Lines/employee in 2003 n.a. ~1500 ~180 300-400  
Growth in users in 2004 
(%) 
50% 10–20 % ~ 5% < 10%  
2004 turnover ($m) 75 1250-1350 800-850 150-170  
COMPATIBILIZATION OF TELECOM LEGISLATION WITH BOTH THE EU 
ACQUIS AND THE NATIONAL CONDITIONS  
Two acts with a special impact on industry were passed in 2002, and could 
be enacted this year. These laws are applied in the EU, a region with 
much more developed economies and telecommunications compared 
to Romania. Implementing them in Romania should take into account 
these differences. Most of EU countries have liberalized their 
telecommunications on January 1st, 1998 and their experience should not 
be neglected. 
Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
One of these acts is the law of universal service (directive 2002/22/EC), 
which could be enforced this year, and for which 1% of the operators’ 
turnover was proposed to ensure resources. According to directive 
2002/22/EC, member states shall ensure that telephony services are 
available to all end-users in their territory, independently of geographical 
location and at affordable price. Prior to analyzing the effects of 
enforcing USO in Romania, Iet’s focus on its features. Countries have put 
USO in practice after reaching a certain level of development, in order to 
benefit specific low-income social groups, or groups living in remote areas 
(insular, mountain, or rural). Universal service was provided in education, 
health, water, railroads, etc. in order to create a level playing field for a 
minority of disadvantaged citizens. Could USO be applied in Romania? 
What constitutes a minority in prosperous countries is a majority in 
Romania, poverty being a widespread phenomenon.  
For USO every company should pay 1% of its turnover to create a fund to 
finance it. In 2003, the industry turnover was some US$2.2bn, so in 2004 
US$22m might be raised, enough for 10,000 – 20,000 new lines in rural 
areas. 47% of Romanians live in rural areas, fixed lines penetration being 
under 10% (as compared to Romania’s total penetration of 20%). Installing 
20,000 new lines yearly, penetration could only increase by 1% in ten 
years. The proposed mechanism will not work properly, the funds raised 
being too low for Romania’s needs. Also, these funds for USO should not 
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come from telecommunications, which despite of its evolution much over 
the national GDP is still ranked on last positions in Europe.  
It is true that EU countries use the “1% mechanism” but not for addressing 
half of country’s population. This 1% should remain in telecommunications, 
as long as most operators encounter problems. RomTelecom was trying to 
raise US$200m, CosmoRom has problems regarding its survival, and 
Telemobil tries to raise US$100m for development. MobiFon (Connex) and 
Orange have more than US$200m in debts. There are also other examples 
to show that Romanian telecoms are in a fragile equilibrium, which could 
be disturbed with serious consequences by an imposed implementation of 
USO. More, it’s time to help telecom operators to pass this period, as other 
EU countries are doing.  
An example of brutal application of USO comes from Czech Republic 
where, according to Financial Times (February 23rd, 2004 issue), Cesky 
Telecom sued the national regulatory body to recuperate losses due to 
USO application. Cesky Telecom accused the regulatory body of refusing 
a proper increase in monthly subscription necessary to cover losses. 
According to the privatization contract, Cesky Telecom was forced to 
invest US$5bn in network modernization, while the mobile telephony boom 
and the 2001 liberalization forced the company to reduce long distance 
tariffs. The regulatory body has permitted only a small increase in local 
tariffs even if these were only half of West European tariffs. Investments 
made have become inefficient, affecting seriously the shareholders 
interests. It is important to remember that RomTelecom also took into court 
ANRC for similar reasons.     
Certainly, Romania should develop its telecom infrastructure and much 
more funds should be attracted. It is crystal clear that using telecom 
industry resources was not sufficient to keep pace with Europe, while 
imposing a 1% fee on industry turnover will only use the industry’s scarce 
resources the gap being too wide to be closed. New funds must be 
attracted, first of all those generated by Romanian telecommunications. 
For instance, the sale of four 3G licenses, which could raise US$140m; the 
sale of important stakes in RomTelecom, Radiocomunicaţii, 
Telecomunicaţii CFR, Teletrans raising around US$500m; fees paid by 
telecom operators (frequency usage, etc.). It is very important that all 
these telecom funds contribute to telecommunications development. Or, 
Teletrans, Telecomunicaţii CFR, etc. privatization should be done by share 
capital increase so its results will contribute to telecom infrastructure 
development.  
Other financing resources could come from the state budget and EU 
funds. Romania should include in its budget funds for rural areas 
telephony. In late 2003, Minister Mircea Geoană announced €3bn funds 
for Romania via ISPA, SAPARD and PHARE programs and other 
infrastructure projects for 2004 - 2006. In February 2004, the EU has 
announced €10bn during the 2007 - 2009 period to accelerate Romania’s 
rural development. An important part of this money should be directed 
towards telecommunications, to become an engine for Romania’s 
sustainable economic growth. 
The law of universal service, as formulated today, is an excessive 
regulation (too many obligations for providers, etc.), which is against the 
liberalization spirit that is deregulation.  
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Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) 
Another law, probably coming into force this year, is ‘Local Loop 
Unbundling’ (European directive 2002/19/EC), according to which new 
entrants will have access to RomTelecom ’local loop’ - circuits connecting 
exchanges with customers. LLU was launched 20 years ago in USA and UK, 
countries that were de-monopolizing telecommunications. At the time 
mobile telephony and cable TV did not exist, and without other 
alternative, the access to incumbents’ local loop was meant to spur 
competition. The only local loop considered was the symmetrical pair, not 
the coaxial cable used by cable operators, or radio channel used by 
mobile operators. 
After 20 years, USA, a pioneer of de-monopolization, is reconsidering its 
position and becoming a pioneer of ‘re-monopolization’. Thus, FCC, the 
US telecoms regulatory body, adopted regulations meant to limit access 
to incumbents’ local loop. They considered more important protecting the 
main operators during the telecom crisis rather than obtaining some 
hypothetical benefits. UK is also intending to reconsider its position. Late in 
2003, Stephan Carter, executive director of the newly established 
regulatory super-authority – Ofcom - was considering whether they should 
continue encouraging new entrants to use British Telecom infrastructure, or 
rather support competition in infrastructure. This happened in UK, a 
country that can not complain about lack of infrastructure. In general, LLU 
use has not led to competition, strong competition occurring where LLU 
did not act. The strongest competitors for incumbents are cable and 
mobile operators in USA, while in Europe mobile operators, mobile 
telephony penetration being double compared to fixed telephony.  
Liberalization of telecommunications in the EU took place on January 1st, 
1998, when the fixed lines penetration rate was on average 52%, the 
infrastructure being well enough developed for new entrants to rent (e.g. 
local loop); all this while mobile telephony and cable TV were in their 
infancy. The results of LLU were not at all outstanding: five years after 
liberalization Deutsche Telekom had 98% of German local market, while 
UK’s British Telecom has 82% of local market after 20 years of liberalization. 
One year, one percent!  
In Romania, liberalization unveiled a poor fixed infrastructure, ranking it on 
the last places in Europe: some 4.4m lines, 20% penetration, waiting list, 
manual exchanges, etc. New entrants have scarce local loop resources 
to access. Access could be easier to mobile networks, which are better 
developed (over 7m users by end of 2003, covering 95% of population), or 
to cable networks, which wired some 45% of Romania’s households. But, 
the law does not specify how LLU can be applied in the case of mobile 
and cable networks.  
The experience of other countries did not reveal spectacular results, 
except clashes with incumbents. Which could be the results of LLU in 
Romania? Besides repeating other countries experience, LLU could detour 
investments from developing local infrastructure, while Romania’s priority 
would be to reduce the gap in fixed line penetration compared to 
European countries. LLU has generated competition in retailing, which 
proved inefficient even in countries with developed infrastructures. 
Romania is trying to implement a European legislation that has not 
revealed outstanding results, and that was not yet abolished by world 
telecommunications.  
20 years ago, LLU 
was meant to spur 
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Fair regulations for a fair competition in Romanian 
telecommunications 
Since 1997, when GSM900 operators were launched, fixed and mobile 
telephony has competed on the same market, that of telephony, a fair 
competition being necessary.  
Mobile telephony: tariffs are too high 
Romania is the only country in Central Europe with two mobile operators 
(Connex and Orange) having 96% of the mobile market. Usually in Central 
Europe the third operator has over 15% market share. In Romania we have 
a duopoly structure, which may stifle competition. This was possible due to 
the outstanding performances of GSM900 operators and a favorable 
context. The latter includes the repeated attempts of Telemobil to re-
launch its services, the delicate situation of CosmoRom, as well as, the 
regulatory frame. Today, despite of lowest costs (Capex, Opex), 
termination tariffs in a mobile network are the highest. For instance, at the 
commercial launch, a call from Atlas Telecom network to a mobile 
operator was more expensive (€ 0.14/minute) than one toward a 
European country (€0.12/minute). Very high termination tariffs are 
discouraging competition on telephony market, preventing small 
companies from growing. Currently, investments in mobile telephony are 
much lower (~US$300/user) compared to classical fixed telephony 
(~US$600/user), while strangely, tariffs even in the same network are 
higher. (Tab. 1) Other curiosity: the only monitored (namely, limited) tariffs 
are fixed telephony tariffs. High mobile telephpony tariifs are inhibiting 
competition, making small companies to become smaller, on medium 
term. 
It should be mentioned that investment levels of the three mobile 
technologies operating in Romania are slightly different. For this reason, 
tariffs for mobile calls terminated in the same or in other networks should 
be approximately equal. If tariffs were put on costs, those for mobile 
telephony could be lower than those for fixed calls!  
Putting mobile tariffs on costs (based on the LRIC model, for instance) will 
eliminate a competition barrier, paving the way for a fair competition in 
Romanian telecommunications. Until this will become a reality, one should 
establish termination tariffs in mobile networks at the level of termination 
tariffs in RomTelecom’s fixed telephony network, namely €0.0255/minute 
during peak time, instead of the existing US$0.10/minute. 
€cents2.55/minute termination tariff could be a beginning.  
Fixed telephony: between a social service and the much delayed tariff 
rebalancing 
If the mobile telephony is a deregulated market, fixed telephony, the 
recently liberalized market, is still an over-regulated one. Liberalization, by 
opening three markets (local, interurban and international), should lead to 
rebalancing of tariffs. This is needed, as the new competitors will offer 
services based on own costs, not being obliged to offer subsidies. Strong 
competition on the international market has triggered dramatic decrease 
in tariffs, market players being happy to arbitrate between RomTelecom’s 
high tariffs (to subsidize local calls) and the low VoIP tariffs. Something 
similar will happen on interurban market as new competitors enter, 
placing RomTelecom yet again in a delicate situation.  
Doubling telephony penetration in Hungary between 1994 and 1997 was 
possible, inter alia, due to the ‘price-cap’ formula, permitting investments 
Putting mobile tariffs 
on costs can 
encourage 
competition. 
Termination tariffs in 
mobile networks 
should be equal to 
those in the fixed 
network: 
0.0255€/min, 
instead of the 
current US$0.10 
P O L I C Y  W A R N I N G  R E P O R T  ( P W R )  –  J U N E  2 0 0 4  
 39 
of US$500m yearly. Today, RomTelecom may decrease long distance 
tariffs but is not allowed to increase local tariffs accordingly. The result 
being that the local market is blocked. The official reason for controlling 
local tariffs was the lack of competition, while poor competition is the 
result of an unattractive market: high investment and low return due to 
controlled tariffs. To break this vicious circle one should permit market 
mechanisms to act. Consequently, local tariffs should be established by 
demand and supply, as it happens in any competitive market. This is a 
way to de-block the local market and to eliminate the existing telecom 
gap. 
Competing with mobile telephony and new technologies, classical fixed 
telephony has no real chances in the existing context (higher 
investment/line, lower tariffs compared to mobile telephony, etc.), so on 
medium term one should determine if Romania still needs fixed telephony. 
If the answer were positive, assuming that Romania does not afford to 
stop using the fixed phone network, then the market mechanisms should 
be allowed to act in telecommunications. It is the time to let the 
demand/supply mechanism work in the Romanian fixed telephony local 
market, too. Let’s leave the market to establish the local tariffs. In all 
likelihood a rational operator will not impose too high tariffs to lose its 
clients and to bankrupt its business. It is therefore the time to consider fixed 
telephony a business, as mobile telephony was until now.  
Liberalization, also called deregulation, will succeed only if it really means 
a market deregulation. The current over-regulation (tariffs control, USO, 
etc.) in fixed telephony will hinder the operators’ evolution and will act as 
entry barriers for newcomers. Other countries experience has proved it, 
and it is a big mistake to ignore it.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
• Due to delayed reform and lack of understanding of the 
telecommunications economics, Romania has today one of the 
lowest fixed line penetration rates (20%) in Central Europe, even if in 
1998 it was ranked ahead of Hungary and Poland. In the rural areas, 
where 47% of the population lives, the density is even lower – 10%.  
• Romania’s main problem remains the local network. For bridging this 
digital divide large investments are needed to be attracted from 
outside the industry.  
• The fixed telephony must be regarded as business and not a social 
service. Political pressures to reduce tariffs lead to a low quality of the 
service, waiting lists and a slower development of the fixed locla 
infrastructure – gradually placing Romania on the lowest rank, in what 
penetration rate is concerned, among Central European countries.  
Liberalization, on January 1, 2003, lead only to deregulation of the long 
distance tariffs. The local tariffs must also be freely established by the 
market. This can act as means to unblock the local market and 
reduce the gap between Romanian and the rest of Europe, while 
RomTelecom could rebalance its tariffs. The Law for universal Service 
represents and excessive regulation for Romania, being in 
contradiction with the practice of market liberalization. 
• Legal framework for a fair competition. (1) In the competition with the 
mobile telephony, the fixed telephony is technologically 
disadvantaged and also overregulated. Liberalizing the fixed phone 
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services could lead to a fair competition. (2) Placing the mobile tariffs 
on costs (following the LRIC model, for example) will eliminate a barrier 
in the way of competition. 
• Encouraging competition in mobile telephony. (1) Today the GSM900 
operators have some 96% market share, which is a unique situation in 
Europe. Competition is absent in the presence of a duopoly. (2) Even if 
investments in the mobile telephony are smaller than those in fixed 
telephony, the services in the mobile network have much higher 
prices. High termination tariffs in mobile networks discourage 
competition, and on a medium term, prevent small companies from 
growing. In this direction, the mobile telephony tariffs should be put on 
costs. Also, until this is attained, the tariffs for termination in mobile 
networks should be equal with those from the fixed network: 
€cents2.55/minute, instead of US$ 0.10, as it is now. (3) CosmoRom 
needs a strategic partner, one with at least regional ambitions, to 
rapidly construct a new business model; otherwise we will make the 
Guiness Book of Records with the first bankrupcy of a GSM operator.  
• In the process of adopting EU laws in telecommunications, these 
should be adapted to the national context, too – the macroeconomic 
and telecommunication ones. (1) The Universal service was applied 
by prosperous nations  to help minority groups (very few of citizens!) 
while in Romania poverty is a mass phenomenon. Also, the amount 
proposed for financing the Universal Service (1% of the turnover) is 
insufficient for Romania’s needs and it should not be taken from an 
industry which, despite of its evolution much over the national 
economy, was not able to keep the pace with the rest of Europe. 
Excessive regulations imposed by the law can make its 
implementation difficult. (2) 20 years ago, when no alternative was 
available, the access to the local loop of the incumbents was mean to 
spur competition. Today even the promoters of LLU are reconsidering 
their position. LLU did not lead to competition even in the presence of 
a strong infrastructure  - 52%, the average of EU penetration rate. 
Romania’s penetration rate is at 20%, thus the newly entered on the 
market do not have much to access. The rigurous implementation of 
the LLU law in Romania can misdirect investment form increasing 
penetration. 
• For increasing penetration in rural areas other funding sources must be 
attracted, such as: (1) Funding from telecommunications resulted 
after: awarding the 3G licenses (approx. US$140m), selling shares of 
RomTelecom (IPO!), Radiocomunicaţii, POSTelecom, or 
Telecomunicaţii CFR and Teletrans (over US$500m), taxes raised 
(frequencies usage, etc.), or privatizing the operators 
Radiocomunicaţii, Telecomunicaţii CFR, Teletrans by raising their share 
capital; (2) Funds from the state budget; (3) Funding from the European 
Union through ISPA, SAPARD, PHARE or other specific programs for rural 
areas. 
• It is also necessary to raise the competitiveness of state companies 
Radiocomunicaţii, POSTelecom, or Telecomunicaţii CFR and Teletrans, 
namely (1) emergency privatization through attracting a strategic 
partner and investment funds, and (2) privatization through raising the 
share capital. 
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